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Abstract I provide an analysis of epistemic numbers, such as twenty-some NP.
Epistemic numbers are syntactically complex numbers formed by some combina-
tion of number and (non-numerical) indefinite expressions that convey uncertainty,
vagueness or ignorance. I examine these constructions in a number of languages
and provide an analysis that capitalizes on independently motivated properties of
their two sub-components: epistemic indefinites and complex numerals. I argue
that variability in these two components explain the cross-linguistics variability in
the nature and interpretation of epistemic numbers across languages.
Keywords: Epistemic indefinites, numerals, implicatures, ignorance, uncertainty
1 Introduction
Natural languages allow a variety of ways of expressing indeterminacy, uncertainty
and ignorance. Epistemic indefinites, also referred to occasionally as anti-specific
indefinites, figure prominently among these. Epistemic indefinites are indefinite
determiners or pronouns that convey information about the epistemic state of the
speaker, by signaling that she is ignorant or uncertain about some claim. These type
of indefinites are moreover, well attested in a multitude of typologically unrelated
languages (e.g. see the survey in Haspelmath 1997). For instance, in ordinary out
of the blue contexts, English some, German irgendein and Spanish algún all signal
that the speaker does not know what the witness of the existential claim is. In the
case of (1), that the speaker does not know what doctor María married, as signaled
by the (in)appropriateness of the follow-ups in (2).
(1) a. María married some doctor.
b. Maria
Maria
hat
has
irgendeinen
IRGENDEINEN
Arzt
doctor
geheiratet.
married
c. María
María
se
REFL
ha
has
casado
married
con
with
algún
ALGÚN
médico.
doctor
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(2) a. But I don’t know who.
b. # She married Dr. Smith.
Epistemic indefinites however need not convey ignorance about particular indi-
viduals. As Weir (2012) discusses, English some may also combine with subkind
denoting NPs to convey epistemic ignorance of the speaker about the relevant sub-
kind, but not about the witness of the existential claim. In the two examples below
(from Weir 2012: 180), there is no doubt that the speaker knows for a fact what is
the particular individual she is referring to; instead, some conveys ignorance about
the subkind those individuals belong to.
(3) a. I saw some contraption in the copy room this morning.
b. Doctor, some growth appeared on my arm. Should I be worried?
This papers contributes to the growing body of literature on epistemic indefi-
nites by discussing an understudied type of epistemic indefinite: epistemic num-
bers. A variety of languages allow constructions where non-numerical expressions
combine with numbers in order to form complex cardinal numerals. In such con-
structions, instead of denoting a single value, the resulting number denotes a range
of possible values. In English, for instance, the indefinite determiner some can com-
bine not only with individual denoting and subkind denoting nouns, but also with
numbers, as illustrated in (4).
(4) a. Twenty-some people came to the party.
b. I have won over thirty-some thousand dollars at the local bingo.
The two constructions in (4) have in common that they convey ignorance about the
exact quantity in question, either about the exact number of people that came to the
party (4a), or about the exact amount of dollars that she won (4b). For instance,
if the speaker knew that between twenty-one and twenty-six people came to the
party, she could truthfully and felicitously use either (4a). And in a situation where
the speaker knew the exact number of people that came to the party, it would be
infelicitous to use (4a) as an answer to a question like how many people came to
the party? For convenience, then, we can offer the following working definition of
epistemic numbers:
(5) Epistemic Numbers
Syntactically complex numbers formed by some combination of number and
(non-numerical) indefinite expressions that convey uncertainty or ignorance.
In this respect, what all the indefinites in (1) through (4) have in common is that
they are incompatible with full knowledge, and so they require of the speaker to be
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in a certain belief/knowledge state. My goal in this paper is to provide an analysis of
epistemic numbers that captures these similarities by making use of independently
attested properties of epistemic indefinites and the syntax/semantics of complex
numerals. To do so, I adapt and elaborate on ideas by Hurford (1975) and Alonso-
Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito (2013) as implemented by Anderson (2015).
Before I turn to the main section of the paper, I discuss first some key properties
that epistemic numbers display across languages. Then, building on previous work
by Hurford (1975), Ionin & Matushansky (2006) and Anderson (2015), I provide a
specific proposal for the syntax/semantics of ordinary cardinal numbers to form the
foundation for the later analysis of epistemic numbers. In the final portion, I identify
the epistemic effect as a case of modal variation and suggest one way of calculating
this inference, following proposals in Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito (2013)
and Anderson (2015), and conclude by discussing some outstanding questions and
issues.
2 Epistemic numbers across languages
Take a brief Q&A dialog like the following:
(6) a. How many people came to the party?
b. Twenty-some people came.
Given that the response in (6b) did not mention an exact number, how much in-
formation did the speaker convey? Like with other numbers, epistemic numbers
convey a lower bound. In the case of (6b)’s response, the speaker knows that no
less than twenty-one people came. It also seems that if the speaker knew that more
than twenty-nine people came, she would not have answered with (6b); thus, we
may conclude that epistemic numbers may also convey upper bounds.1 The re-
sulting state of affairs is one where the speaker who answered with (6b) knew that
between twenty-one and twenty-nine people came to the party, no less, no more.
(7) The answer in (6b) is true iff. . .
a. 3 [21;29] people came
b. 8  [20] people came
c. 8  [30] people came
1 I will make the simplifying assumption that this upper bound emerges semantically and postpone
discussion of whether this is the best characterization for a future occasion. For discussion on
ordinary numerals, see Breheny 2008 and Spector 2013, a.o.
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The fact that epistemic numbers denote lower and upper bounds suggests that
they are not to be confused with approximate numbers (cf. Sauerland & Stateva
2007, Krifka 2009, a.o.). For instance, the expressions in the right hand side of (8)
may all be true of nineteen people:
(8) twenty-some people 6=
8>>>><>>>>:
some twenty people2
around twenty people
about twenty people
more or less twenty people
twenty-odd people
That epistemic numbers in English are constrained to the range of values be-
tween twenty-one and twenty-nine indicates a connection between the range of val-
ues that they denote and the numbers that could have taken the place of the indefi-
nite. In English, no grammatical combination of the number twenty with any other
number is able to form a complex numeral denoting values either below twenty-one
or above twenty-nine (Anderson 2015). In other words, it seems that we can im-
pute the upper bound of epistemic number to the lack of a grammatical variant of
twenty-eleven and such.
There are two previously unnoticed cross-linguistic axes of variation with re-
spect to the upper/lower bounds conveyed by epistemic numbers. The first one con-
cerns the base of the language at hand. English is a base-ten language, as witnessed
by the limitation noted above to form numbers such as twenty-eleven. But there
are languages with bases other than ten that also possess epistemic numbers. What
we observe in such cases is that the range of available values varies accordingly
to the base of the language. For instance, Basque, unlike English, is a predomi-
nantly base-twenty language, where forms such as twenty-eleven are the only way
to express the number thirty-one.
(9) a. hogei
twenty
- ta
and
- hamaika
eleven
‘thirty-one’
b. ber
two
- hogei
twenty
- ta
and
- hamaika
eleven
‘fifty-one’
The western variety of Basque (not others) possesses an epistemic number formed
by combining a number, a conjunctive particle and plural marker (Azkue 1905/1969).
As indicated below, the range of values that an epistemic number of the form
2 But see Stevens & Solt (2018) for reasons why some-n is not always an approximator.
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twenty-indefinite is compatible with in Western Basque is limited to the next multi-
ple of twenty, not the next multiple of ten.
(10) a. hogei
twenty
- ta
and
- sa
and
- k
PL
‘twenty-some or thirty-some’ 3 [21;39] 8  [20]; 8  [40]
b. ber
two
- hogei
twenty
- ta
and
- sa
and
- k
PL
‘forty-some or fifty-some’ 3 [41;59] 8  [40]; 8  [60]
These contrasts between English and Basque make good our earlier observation
the range of possible values denoted by an epistemic number is determined by the
base of the number system in the language.
The second axis of cross-linguistic variation corresponds to the indefinite it-
self. Some language, such as Spanish, permit epistemic numbers to be constructed
from a variety of indefinite expressions. These are the epistemic indefinite algún
(“some”), and the nouns pico and tantos, both of which denote indeterminate quan-
tities.
(11) a. sesenta
sixty
y
and
{ pico / tanto
some
/ algo }
‘sixty-some’
b. ciento
hundred
y
and
{ pico / tanto
some
/ algo }
’hundred and some’
But unlike English, Spanish also allows epistemic indefinites with quantifier-
determiners other than some, in particular with the vague quantifiers muchos and
pocos, the counterparts of English many and few respectively. In these cases the
upper and lower bounds must be adjusted, as they are further limited by the type of
determiner that forms the epistemic numbers. Below I represent muchos as limiting
the available values of (12a) to the upper half of those in (11a), whereas pocos is
represented as selecting their lower half.
(12) a. sesenta
sixty
y
and
mucho
many
3 [66;69] 8  [65]; 8  [70]
b. sesenta
sixty
y
and
poco
few
3 [61;64] 8  [60]; 8  [65]
It should be noted, however, that intuitions about what the bounds of epistemic
numbers formed with muchos and pocos are, unfortunately, not as sharp. While
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all speakers admit that a sentence containing the number (12a) is false for a value
like sixty-two, it is less clear where the exact lower bound is. The same holds of
the upper bound of epistemic indefinites formed with quantifier pocos. Moreover,
given the vague nature of muchos and pocos, one could think of cases where values
in the lower half, e.g. sixty-four, are judged to be significantly more in the relevant
respect than just sixty. In that case, then, (12a) should be felicitous in such contexts.
For these reasons, the bounds expressed in (12) must be taken to be an idealization
rather than set on stone.3
Summing up, what we find cross-linguistically is that (i) epistemic numbers
denote lower and upper bounds and convey ignorance on the speaker part as to the
exact value; (ii) the range of available numbers is determined by the base of the
number system in the language; and (iii) more than one type of indefinite may be
allowed.
In order to account for the properties in (i) through (iii) above, I begin by pro-
viding a full syntactic/semantic account of complex cardinal numbers that follows
the positional notation for cardinal numbers. Then, following earlier work by An-
derson (2015), I show how we can integrate epistemic numbers within this general
account, and what exactly the connection to epistemic indefinites is. Relying on this
close resemblance to epistemic indefinites, I show that their pragmatic behavior,
i.e. the epistemic effect, can be captured as a conversational implicature conveying
modal variation.
3 A syntax/semantics for numbers
3.1 Background assumptions
In spelling out my particular take on the syntax/semantics of complex numeral ex-
pressions I rely on two main background assumptions. The first one is a general
design of number systems. As Hurford (1975, 1987) showed, number systems in
most languages share two fundamental aspects when it comes to constructing com-
plex numerals. First, syntactically, complex numerals have a complex syntactic
structure. In languages like English, for instance, there are two different syntactic
environments, additive and multiplicative,4 as illustrated in Figure 1.
Second, from a semantic standpoint, these additive and multiplicative environ-
3 The complications increase the with epistemic numbers ranging over higher values. Take a numeral
equivalent to “a hundred and few euros”. Would the sentence be true in case the real value was 145?
4 I will gloss over the third environment, exponentiation. The reason is that, unlike additive and
multiplicative environments, exponentiation is rather opaque, as there is a strong cross-linguistic
tendency to use portmanteau forms for the lower powers (such as hundred, thousand and million in
English).
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+
 +
 +
 1
one
+ 103
thousand
 3
three
7
seven
102
hundred
8
eight
10
ty
5
five
10
ty
Figure 1 Structure of number 83751 (Hurford 1975, 1987)
ments are interpreted as addition and multiplication operations on numbers.5
(13) J83751K =  (810)+3103+ 7102+  (510)+1
My second assumption concerns the general geometry of the DPs modified by
numerals. Following ideas in Ionin & Matushansky (2006) and Solt (2015), I rep-
resent numerals as specifiers of a Number projection headed by NUM, which then
combines directly with an NP.
(14) [DP D [NumP [DP numeral][NumP NUM NP]]]
The head NUM is similar to a gradable predicate in that it expresses a relation
between a property of individuals, the NP, and a degree along some scale; in this
case, the cardinality scale.
(15) JNUMK = lPheti:ldd:lxe:[P(x)^jxj= d]
I follow Anderson (2015) and take numbers themselves to be born as predicates
of degrees, type hd; ti, which then are lowered by a generalized version of the iota
type-shift originally proposed by Partee (1987) so as to serve as arguments to NUM
(i.e. shift Phdti to id[P(d)]). With these assumptions, the representation of a simple
Number Phrase like twenty-three shoes is given below.
5 A minority of languages use other environments as well. Latin shows subtractive environments (un-
de-viginti, one-from-twenty, i.e. 19), Welsh shows division (hanner cant, “half hundred”, i.e. 50)
and a strategy often referred to as overcounting, as old Danish (halv-tred-sinds-tyve; “half-third-
times-twenty”, i.e. 50, or “half of the third twenty”). Examples from Comrie (1999).
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(16) NumP
lx:[jxj= id:[d = 23]^ shoes(x)]
DP
IOTA/MAX
DP
twenty-three
NumP
NUM NP
shoes
3.2 Complex numbers
We turn now to the internal structure of complex numbers. In this respect I make
two contributions that depart from earlier proposals in the literature. First, I repre-
sent additive and multiplicative environments as syntactic heads with selecting for
number denotations and that add and multiple them, respectively. In a sense, this
is a fully-faithful instantiation of Hurford’s suggestion couched in current syntac-
tic/semantic assumptions. This was already suggested by Anderson (2015) for the
additive environment, I simply extend it here to the multiplicative environment as
well; the definitions of the respective heads are provided below.
(17) a. JADDK = lD0:lD00:ld:9d0d00[d = d0+d00^D0(d0)^D00(d00)]
b. JMULK = lD0:lD00:ld:9d0d00[d = d0d00^D0(d0)^D00(d00)]
Semantically, the task of ADD and MUL is no other than taking two singleton prop-
erties of degrees and to add/multiple them, resulting in the property that is true of
the degree that is equal to the sum/multiplication.
Second, I propose that there is more structure to numbers than meets the eye,
also in the case of simplex numbers. Specifically, all cardinal numbers are the prod-
uct of some integer n2f1;2; :::;9g and a numerical base Bn. This amounts to saying
that natural languages construct numbers like we represent them in the positional
notation. For instance, in the decimal system, as in Spanish and English, B is a
power of 10, and so JBnK= ld:[d = 10n]. Different number systems, however, may
make use of different bases, and thus identical underlying structures for a number
such as 40 may be expressed in different ways.
(18) a. English/SpanishJ40K = [ 4 [MUL B1]] = [ 4 [MUL 10]] four tens
b. BasqueJ40K = [ 2 [MUL B1]] = [ 2 [MUL 20]] two twentys
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As an illustration, consider the following semantic representation of the number
83751 below (cf. Figure 1).6
(19) Full structure of 83751"
[8 MUL B4] ADD

[3 MUL B3] ADD
h
[7 MUL B2] ADD

[5 MUL B1] ADD [1 MUL B0]
i#
Arriving at the resulting (singleton) property of degrees is now straightforward. All
numbers start off in a multiplicative environment combining with a base that then
get added. So for the number 51 we have:
(20) a. J5K = ld:[d = 5]
b. JB1K = J10K = ld:[d = 10]
c. J50K= [5 [MUL B1]] = [5 [MUL 10]] = JMULK(J10K)(J5K)$ ld:[d = 50]
(21) J51K = [5 [ADD 1]] = JADDK(J1K)(J5K) $ ld:[d = 50+1]
It is clear how to proceed for the rest of the complex number by recursively applying
the same operations.
Directly referencing the base in the structure of the number makes it straight-
forward to extend the analysis to languages with uncommon bases. For instance,
Ngkolmpu, a Kanum language spoken in southern New Guinea, has a base-6 num-
ber system, where the portmanteau forms correspond to the powers of 6: traowo is
6 (61), ptae is 36 (62), tarumpao is 216 (63), etc. Correspondingly, the number 13
is expressed as yempoka traowo naempr (“two six one”), whose structure looks as
below:
(22)

[2 MUL B1] ADD [1 MUL B0]

=

[2 MUL 6] ADD [1 MUL 1]

$ ld:[d = 12+1]
Summing up, the two characterizing features of the syntax/semantics of com-
plex numerals that I proposed above are (i) that if follows to the end Hurford’s
suggestion of having two distinct environments (additive and multiplicative) and
(ii) that numbers are constructed off of a combination with a (power of) the base.
4 Epistemic Numbers
We are now ready to extend the analysis of numbers to epistemic numbers. The
obvious question is: how does an indefinite ever get to appear in the place of a num-
ber? In order to answer this question, it is worth thinking about what the indefinite
6 This is not the only possible representation, for instance the following would also work:h
[8 MUL B1] ADD [3 MUL B0]

MUL [1 MUL B3]
i
ADD
h
[7 MUL B2] ADD

[5 MUL B1] ADD [1 MUL B0]
i
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does when it combines with a number. As we saw earlier, indefinites in epistemic
numbers behave in identical fashion to epistemic indefinites elsewhere. To capture
this behavior, I follow the core of the analysis of the epistemic indefinite algún in
Spanish provided by Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito (2010, 2013), and apply it
to numeral constructions, a common strategy for English as well (Anderson 2015,
Stevens & Solt 2018). That is, I treat the indefinite as denoting an anti-singleton
subset selection function over numbers. (I will use INDEF as a blanket term for
some and algo/tantos, etc.) The semantic task of INDEF is to take a set of numbers
and return some non-singleton subset.
(23) JINDEFK = l fhdt;dti:lDhdti:ldd : j f (D)j> 1 : [ f (D)(d)]
Thus, indefinites in epistemic numbers are identical to epistemic indefinites at large
in coming with the same anti-singleton constraint.
But then, if f selects a value from a set of numbers where do those numbers
come from? Here I follow work by Kayne (2005), Zweig (2005), Schwarzschild
(2006) and Anderson (2015) a.o., who show that indefinites and vague quantifier-
determiners such as many and few never combine directly with a property, but they
do so through the mediation of a silent noun NUMBER. Thus, like other quantity
expressions, indefinites in epistemic indefinites can be taken to combine with nom-
inals via a null element.
(24) a. few books = [[few NUMBER] books] [Kayne 2005; Zweig 2005]
b. twenty-some books = [[two [some NUMBER]] books] [Anderson 2015]
It is this NUMBER null head that provides the relevant set of numbers from
which the indefinite must pick a non-singleton subset. Specifically, I suggest that
the denotation of NUMBER is simply the set of “basic” numbers (those not requiring
ADD, i.e. those combining with the “zero” base, B0), which varies depending on
the base of the system.7
(25) JNUMBERK = f1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8;9g [$fd : B0 > d > B1g for base-10]
We now have all the pieces in place to provide a semantics for epistemic num-
bers. Consider the numeral twenty-some.
7 Rather than limiting its semantic content, Anderson opts for letting NUMBER range over the whole
domain of degrees, which may possibly lead to some over-generation issues that are avoided here
(see Anderson 2015: 67–68). On the other hand, as discussed earlier in fn.1, it is an open question
whether epistemic numbers semantically convey an upper-bound.
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(26) 20-INDEF
20
ADD DP
D2
MUL B0
D1 NUMBER
INDEF f
(27) a. JD2K
= JINDEFK(J f K)(JNUMBERK)
= ld:[ f (0< d < 10)]
b. JDPK = JMULK(JB0K)(JD2K)
$ ld:[ f (0< d < 10)]
c. J20-INDEFK
= JADDK(JDPK)(J20K)
= ld:9d0d00[d = d0 + d00 ^J20K(d0) ^ f (0< d00 < 10)]
In prose: the indefinite (with the function f syntactically represented) combines
with NUMBER to return some non-singleton subset, which then continues its life
throughout the derivation as any ordinary number does. This results in the set of
numbers obtained by adding 20 to some number in the range [1;10].8
By confining INDEF to a position that only another number could take we cap-
ture the limitation of epistemic numbers to appear only with complex cardinals.
That is, epistemic numbers only combine with numerals that can independently
combine by addition with some other number. If a number like six can combine
with twenty to form twenty-six, then an epistemic number may be formed. How-
ever, numbers where the addition is not performed in the syntax, as with simplex
or grammaticalized forms, epistemic numbers are ruled out. The number quince
(“fifteen”) in Spanish is one such case: quince y dos (“fifteen and two”) is ungram-
matical because quince is a simplex form, unlike e.g. diecieseis (“ten-and-six”; 16);
accordingly, quince-algo and other variants are ungrammatical.
Accounting for the different values available in languages with other bases is
straightforward. A number expression like hogeitazak (“twenty-some” in Western
Basque) has the same structure as that of (26), with the only difference that NUM-
BER now contains integers in the [1;19] range corresponding to a base-20 number
system.
(28) a. JD2K = JINDEFK(J f K)(JNUMBERK) = ld:[ f (0< d < 20)]
b. JDPK = JMULK(JB0K)(JD2K) $ ld:[ f (0< d < 20)]
c. J20-INDEFK = JADDK(JDPK)(J20K)
= ld:9d0d00[d = d0+d00 ^ J20K(d0) ^ f (0< d00 < 20)]
8 As discussed by Anderson (2015), being of type hd; ti, cannot saturate the d argument of NUM–see
(16). Since lowering via iota is not an option, the derivation must proceed by lifting the type of the
epistemic number to a generalized quantifier over degrees (type hhd; ti; ti), by means of a generalized
variant of the A lifter from Partee 1987, shifting Phsti to lQhsti:9as :[P(a)^Q(a)]. The result is a
generalized quantifier over degrees that QRs to a propositional level node.
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In the case of variation in the indefinite itself in languages like Spanish, the
derivation proceeds exactly as before, with the difference that the range of values
made available by the epistemic number is further restricted. To account for this,
I define muchos and pocos by determining the property of numbers that remains
above/below certain threshold. For concreteness–but see discussion in §2–assume
that the threshold is established by the median M of NUMBER, which corresponds
to the nth ordered value of some set of numbers A: n = 12(jAj+ 1). In the decimal
system, the median of NUMBER is always 5.
(29) a. JMUCHOSK = l fhdt;dtilDhdti:ldd : j f (D)j> 1 : [ f (D)(d)^d > M(D)]
b. JPOCOSK = l fhdt;dtilDhdti:ldd : j f (D)j> 1 : [ f (D)(d)^d < M(D)]
The derivation of Spanish twenty-many is provided below.
(30) 20-MUCHOS
20
ADD DP
D2
MUL B0
D1 NUMBER
MUCHOS f
(31) a. JD2K
= JMUCHOSK(J f K)(JNUMBERK)
$ ld:[ f (5< d < 10)]
b. JDPK = JMULK(JB0K)(JD2K)
$ ld:[ f (5< d < 10)]
c. J20-MUCHOSK
= JADDK(JDPK)(J20K)
= ld:9d0d00[d = d0 + d00 ^J20K(d0) ^ f (5< d00 < 10)]
Summing up, this section has shown that we can account for the semantic be-
havior of epistemic numbers by relying on (i) a specific syntax/semantics of cardi-
nal numbers where they are built from syntactic heads comprising their bases, and
(ii) a specific semantics of epistemic indefinites, where they denote subset-selection
functions that may apply to numbers as well as individuals/kinds. Points of varia-
tion in (i) and (ii) across languages also account for the observed variation in the
nature of epistemic numbers. By factoring in base values, the analysis is flexible
enough to account for number systems other than the decimal. The indefiniteness
of epistemic numbers is then due to the fact that f , just like ordinary epistemic in-
definites, is an anti-singleton subset selection function, thus impeding the specific
interpretation of the indefinite.
5 The epistemic effect
So far we have seen that epistemic numbers are “numbers” just like cardinal num-
bers are. This section shows that, in addition, their epistemic effect is also closely
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related to the epistemic effects of epistemic indefinites. Above the epistemic effect
was informally referred to as conveying ignorance or uncertainty of the speaker
about some particular number. In this section I show that the epistemic effect is a
case of modal variation, and is best captured as a conversational implicature, trig-
gered by the fact that the speaker chose to use anti-singleton domain, in parallel
with epistemic indefinites and other determiners (e.g. algún que otro, “some or
other”, in Spanish; Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2013).
5.1 The epistemic effect as a conversational implicature
The epistemic effect of epistemic numbers behaves like other quantity conversa-
tional implicatures in a number of respects, as already argued by Anderson (2015).
It bears their three main signature properties: unlike entailments and presupposi-
tions the effect can be reinforced without fear of redundancy (32a), it can be can-
celed (32b), and it disappears in downward-entailing contexts (32c).
(32) a. I paid twenty-some dollars for this shirt, I don’t know how much exactly.
b. I did pay twenty-some dollars for this shirt, twenty-seven to be precise.
c. I didn’t pay twenty-some dollars for this shirt.  no epistemic effect
The best way to characterize this conversational implicature is as a case of
modal variation (von Fintel 2000, Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2010):
(33) Modal Variation:
9w0;w00 2 Epis;w
 fd : P(w0)(x)^jxj= dg 6= fd : P(w00)(x)^jxj= dg 
As expressed by (33) modal variation requires that there be at least two epis-
temic worlds with distinct values accessible. That this is the case is shown by the
fact that epistemic numbers do not require ignorance about any one particular epis-
temic alternative within the range of possible values. This is in contrast with other
epistemic determiners such at least n, which does require ignorance about whether
n is the case.
(34) a. Sam paid at least 61 $, #but I’m certain she didn’t pay exactly 61$.
 the speaker must consider 61$ as a possibility.
b. Sam paid 60-some $, but I’m certain she didn’t pay {61$/62$. . . }
 the speaker must not consider {61$/62§. . . } as a possibility.
5.2 Derivation
Following the analysis of epistemic indefinites in Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-
Benito (2010) and Anderson (2015), I suggested that epistemic numbers select
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an non-singleton subset of values from a set of numbers. This is an important
step towards deriving the modal variation of epistemic numbers. Building on the
analysis of German irgendein by Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002), Alonso-Ovalle &
Menéndez-Benito 2010 propose that the epistemic effect of Spanish algún arises
because this indefinite signals that its domain of quantification cannot be a sin-
gleton set. Due to the limitation that this anti-singleton constraint imposes on the
domain of quantification, the epistemic indefinite triggers a competition between
the assertion and alternative propositions that would have resulted from restricting
the domain to a singleton.
5.2.1 Epistemic indefinites: the case of algún
As illustration, consider sentence (35a) in a context where there are three rooms
under consideration: the living room, the bedroom and the kitchen (Alonso-Ovalle
& Menéndez-Benito 2010). This sentence is interpreted as (35b), where f selects a
non-singleton subset of the relevant rooms.
(35) a. Juan
Juan
está
is
en
in
alguna
ALGÚN
habitación.
room
‘Juan is in some room or other.’
b. Juan is in f (fliving room, bedroom, kitcheng)
The anti-singleton constraint triggers a competition between (35a) and the stronger
(and relevant) alternatives in (36).
(36) a. Juan is in fliving roomg
b. Juan is in fbedroomg
c. Juan is in fkitcheng
Given that any one of the alternatives in (36) is more informative than the as-
sertion in (35a), why did the speaker not chose one of them? The intuition, first
pursued by Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002), is that by choosing (35a) the speaker is
avoiding making a false claim: the speaker does not have enough evidence for any
one of the stronger alternatives in (36), while still being certain that one of them
must be true. Assume that upon hearing (35b), hearers assume that speakers be-
lieve that their utterance is true–e.g. by following the mandate of the Maxim of
Quality. Moreover, in accordance to basic principles of cooperation and efficiency,
hearers may conclude that the speaker does not believe the truth of any of the more
informative propositions in (36), since otherwise she would have chosen to utter
one such sentence.
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(37) epi(Juan is in f (fliving room, bedroom, kitcheng))
(38) a. :epi(Juan is in fliving roomg)
b. :epi(Juan is in fbedroomg)
c. :epi(Juan is in fkitcheng)
Together with (37), the Primary Implicatures from (38) entail that the speaker does
not know in which room Juan is.
5.2.2 Modal variation with epistemic numbers
A similar reasoning can apply to epistemic numbers as well, given the earlier pro-
posal of treating them as imposing an anti-singleton on the domain of quantification.
A sentence like I paid twenty-some dollars, interpreted as in (39) below (simplified),
triggers a competition with all the singleton number values in the range of epistemic
number, as expressed in (40) (Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2013, Anderson
2015).
(39) 9d[I paid 20+d$^d 2 f (f0< d < 10g)]
(40) a. 9d[I paid 20+d$^d 2 f1g]
b. 9d[I paid 20+d$^d 2 f2g]
. . .
c. 9d[I paid 20+d$^d 2 f9g]
As before, we assume the speaker believes in the truth of her assertion, and conclude
that all the singleton alternatives to (39) were disregarded precisely because the
speaker was not in a position to commit to the truth of any one of them. This results
in the set of Primary Implicatures in (42).
(41) epi(9d[I paid 20+d$^d 2 f (f0< d < 10g)])
(42) a. :epi(9d[I paid 20+d$^d 2 f1g])
b. :epi(9d[I paid 20+d$^d 2 f2g])
. . .
c. :epi(9d[I paid 20+d$^d 2 f9g])
Together (41) and (42) correspond to modal variation: 8d 2 D :epi[f(d)] or al-
ternatively :9d 2 D epi[f(d)].
A number of consequences follow from this strengthened meaning. First, the
speaker’s epistemic state is predicted to be incompatible with full knowledge about
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the number in question, as desired. Second, the epistemic effect is predicted to
be weaker than that of total ignorance; that is, the epistemic state of the speaker
need not be such that she is ignorant about all the values in the relevant range.
This type of absolute ignorance, familiar from multiple disjuncts, is compatible
with epistemic numbers, but they do not require it. In fact, epistemic numbers are
compatible with a fair amount of knowledge in the right context. Consider, for
instance, a sentence like (43).
(43) That night Michael Jordan scored twenty-some points in triples.
In basketball, triples are three-point scores, as opposed to other field scores
which are worth only two points. If (43) was uttered by a basketball enthusiast, the
sentence should be odd if it brought attention to a putative epistemic state where all
the values in [21;29] were taken to be epistemic possibilities for the speaker. This
is not the case, however, and (43) is felicitous in such context. In this case, we need
to add the premise that the speaker knows that, for all numbers d 2 [21;29] and
d =2 f21;24;27g, epi:[f(d)].
(44) a. Premise:
epi:(9d[Michael Jordan scored 20+d points ^ d 2 f2;3;5;6;8;9g])
b. Assertion:
epi(9d[Michael Jordan scored 20+d points ^ d 2 f (f0< d < 10g)])
c. Primary Implicatures:
:epi(9d[Michael Jordan scored 20+d points ^ d 2 f1g)])
:epi(9d[Michael Jordan scored 20+d points ^ d 2 f2g)])
. . .
:epi(9d[Michael Jordan scored 20+d points ^ d 2 f9g)])
In this case, the strengthened meaning of (43) conveys an epistemic inference
about a much reduced domain of quantification.9 As a consequence, the epistemic
possibilities accessible to the speaker are accordingly reduced.10
9 Since epi:[f ] entails :epi[f ] (Hintikka 1962), the Primary Implicatures corresponding to values
not in f21;24;27g are rendered superfluous.
10 Of course, if the hearer ignores the rules of basketball she will lack the relevant premise in (44) and
so the epistemic inference will be about the whole range of values.
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(45) Epistemic possibilities accessible from w0
a. w1: Michael Jordan scored 21 points.
b. w2: Michael Jordan scored 24 points.
c. w3: Michael Jordan scored 27 points.
Summing up, the analysis captures the epistemic effect of epistemic numbers
as a conversational implicature conveying modal variation: a conversational impli-
cature triggered by the anti-singleton constraint on f , which results in the listener
reasoning that the speaker wanted to avoid a false claim.
6 Further work
The take-away from this paper is that epistemic numbers are “epistemic” just like
epistemic indefinites are, and they are “numbers” just like cardinal numbers are.
The main focus of the paper has been to provide an analysis of epistemic numbers
flexible enough to account for their cross-linguistic variation. While this much
has been accomplished, there are further aspects of epistemic numbers that future
work should address. For instance, given the syntax/semantics of numbers defended
here, many kinds of structures may be generated. One may thus wonder, why do
indefinites need to be complements to ADD? Why can’t we say some-three? This
seems to be a matter of cross-linguistic variation as well. Japanese is language that
allows such combinations, by forming epistemic numbers with the indeterminate
pronoun nan (“what”) may also precede a numeral in a multiplicative environment.
In such cases, available values vary accordingly, as expected by the present analysis.
(46) a. nan
what
- juu
ten
- nin
CL-HUMAN
- ka
PART
- ga
NOM
[Anderson 2015: ex. 44]
[[some B1] + 4] 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90
b. hyaku
hundred
- nan
what
- juu
ten
- nin
CL-HUMAN
- ka
PART
- ga
NOM
[[[1  B2] + [some B1]] + 4]
 110, 120, 130, 140, 150, 160, 170, 180, 190
Such strategies are of course not allowed in other languages, just like the flexi-
bility of Spanish to use a number of different indefinite expressions is not attested
elsewhere (to the best of my knowledge). I will these matters as open questions.
Many other questions remain. One may wonder, for instance, why epistemic
numbers of the form INDEF-number, with the indefinite in a multiplicative envi-
ronment, are typologically rarer than number-INDEF, with the indefinite in an ad-
ditive environment. Similarly, this paper does not have much to add about what
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exactly regiments the availability epistemic numbers across languages, or what reg-
iments the availability of various types of indefinites in epistemic numbers across
languages.
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